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ABSTRACT
Eorts by content creators and social networks to enforce legal and
policy-based norms, e.g. blocking hate speech and users, has driven
the rise of unrestricted communication platforms. One such recent
eort is Dissenter, a browser and web application that provides a
conversational overlay for any web page. ese conversations hide
in plain sight – users of Dissenter can see and participate in this
conversation, whereas visitors using other browsers are oblivious
to their existence. Further, the website and content owners have
no power over the conversation as it resides in an overlay outside
their control.
In this work, we obtain a history of Dissenter comments, users,
and the websites being discussed, from the initial release of Dis-
senter in Feb. 2019 through Apr. 2020 (14 months). Our corpus
consists of approximately 1.68M comments made by 101k users
commenting on 588k distinct URLs. We rst analyze macro charac-
teristics of the network, including the user-base, comment distribu-
tion, and growth. We then use toxicity dictionaries, Perspectives
API, and a Natural Language Processing model to understand the
nature of the comments and measure the propensity of particu-
lar websites and content to elicit hateful and oensive Dissenter
comments. Using curated rankings of media bias, we examine the
conditional probability of hateful comments given le and right-
leaning content. Finally, we study Dissenter as a social network,
and identify a core group of users with high comment toxicity.
1 INTRODUCTION
Virtual communities and discussion permeate modern society, and
have fundamentally changed the way information is disseminated
and consumed. Platforms that support such information exchange
face not only technical challenges, but also legal and policy-based
content concerns. Recently, major platforms have established and
enforced policies to restrict hate speech [31] and users that engage
in such activity. Participants of these communities have therefore
moved to new platforms that either passively tolerate or actively
support this content. For example [22, 34] examine speech and
political characteristics of Gab, while [32] characterizes hate speech
in Twier.
Dissenter began as a web browser plugin, but, aer being banned
from the major browsers’ respective plugin and extension stores [5],
morphed into a self-contained, full-edged browser based on Brave [7,
9]. Characterizing itself as the “free speech web browser,” Dissenter
provides, for any URL, a tightly integrated discussion forum specic
to that URL. Only Dissenter users see this discussion forum. us,
while e.g. a news site may have its own discussion forum for a
particular article, Dissenter provides a parallel universe where its
community of users are free to discuss (presumably a dissenting
opinion) without restriction. Notably, the website and content own-
ers have no power over this discussion forum as it resides in an
overlay outside their control.
Similar forms of web annotation and augmentation have been
created in the past, e.g. Google Sidewiki [1] (now defunct) and
Hypothesis [6]. ese eorts, however, were launched in an era
pre-dating restrictions on social media content and not aimed at
freedom of speech or providing a platform for fringe groups to
discuss particular websites and content. In our work, the rst to
aempt to measure and characterize Dissenter, we obtain a history
of Dissenter comments, users, and the websites being discussed
from the initial release of Dissenter in Feb. 2019 through Apr. 2020
(14 months). We nd more than 101k Dissenter users contributing
more than 1.68M comments on 588k unique URLs.
Given recent debate surrounding censorship and the role of so-
cial media platforms in society – with the United States President
signing executive orders to prevent censorship – our work is espe-
cially timely [30]. Toward a deeper understanding of Dissenter as
an emergent platform, we make the following contributions:
• Characterization of the Dissenter user base, including the
intersection with Gab and Reddit
• Analysis of the Dissenter social network, including inu-
ential users and the set of users within individual comment
threads.
• Classication of the toxicity of Dissenter comments and
correlation of classes with both the political bias of the
Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) being commented on,
as well as its content.
2 DISSENTER
In this section, we describe Dissenter, its relationship to its par-
ent application, Gab, and discuss major changes Dissenter has
undergone since its launch in early 2019. We then dene Dissenter-
specic terminology.
2.1 History
A description of the Dissenter plugin, browser, and comment over-
lay system, necessarily begins with Gab [28]. Gab was founded
by Andrew Torba in 2016 as an alternative social network to more
mainstream platforms; Gab counts among its users gures banned
from Twier such as provocateur Milo Yiannopoulos, and reality
television star Tila Tequila. While Gab’s stated purpose is to “cham-
pion free speech, individual liberty and the free ow of information
online” [28], studies [21, 34] suggest Gab is primarily a fringe so-
cial network that contains hate speech and extremist content. Gab
received signicant aention aer anti-Semitic hate speech was
discovered on the Gab account of the individual responsible for the
2018 Tree of Life synagogue shooting in Pisburgh [4, 36].
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Figure 1: Dissenter browser view of YouTube
Dissenter, billed as the “Comment Section of the Internet”, was
released by Gab in February 2019 as a reaction to the disabling
of “comment sections” of some websites by content providers, in-
cluding YouTube. A full 25% of Dissenter users we examine in this
study refer to “censorship” in their prole’s biography, suggesting
that perceived censorship is a common motivator for much of Dis-
senter’s user base. In order to restore the ability for Internet users to
comment on web content, Dissenter acts as a comment aggregation
platform, receiving comments pertaining to URLs and displaying
them to other users of its service. In this manner, Dissenter acts
as a kind of overlay, displaying this “hidden” content only to users
of Dissenter, while visitors that do not use the application remain
unaware of its existence.
Dissenter initially took the form of a Firefox and Chrome browser
extension which, when toggled, allowed users to post and view
comments for a given URL. In April 2019, only two months af-
ter launching, the Dissenter extension was removed by both the
Mozilla and Chrome extension stores. Both stores cited a terms
of service violation, claiming that the extension was used to post
hate speech [5]. Dissenter then morphed into a standalone browser
by forking the Brave web browser [7, 9]. Figure 1 shows an exam-
ple of the conversation overlay visible when viewing the YouTube
homepage using the Dissenter browser.
While providing a standalone browser extricated the Dissenter
plugin from oversight by corporations that might otherwise aempt
to crack down on the speech of its users, it requires users to switch
their default web browser.
To augment the Dissenter browser, and provide a second method
to access Dissenter comments, Gab deployed a news aggregation
site called Gab Trends in October 2019 [8]. Gab Trends presents ti-
tles and short summaries of news articles from around the web, and
includes Dissenter comment threads for each article. e comment
thread visible via the Dissenter browser and Gab Trends is iden-
tical. Registered Dissenter users can participate in the Dissenter
discussion by using the Trends web portal. Further, the Trends
homepage allows submission of new URLs. Upon submiing the
new URL, the user is directed to a web page containing all of the
Dissenter comments that have previously been made about this
URL; if the URL is new to the Dissenter and Gab Trends system,
this page contains no comments, but allows new users that navigate
to it to make comments about this URL.
e popularity of Gab Trends is disputed. Gab itself claims 3M
monthly views [2], while independent sources estimate 67k unique
views per month [3].
2.2 Terminology
Analogous to other social networks, Dissenter users have a home
page. A home page lists their username (a unique handle e.g. “@a”),
display name (which may dier from the username, e.g. “Andrew
Torba”), a brief biographical statement, and a prole image. Impor-
tantly, a home page lists all of the URLs that the user has commented
upon.
Each URL that has received a Dissenter comment or been entered
into Dissenter has a comment page. A comment page is analogous
to a home page for a particular URL. Each comment page contains a
title, which generally corresponds to the title content in the HTML
of the page the URL points to, and a brief description of the content,
which is typically generated by the rst paragraph at the underlying
URL. Some exceptions to title and description content exist, partic-
ularly when the content being commented upon is from another
social network. For instance, both YouTube and Twier content is
typically embedded in the comment page by the Dissenter system,
leading to ambiguous or altogether absent titles and descriptions.
In order to make up for this lack of content data from Dissenter
itself, we handle YouTube separately, which we describe in §3.3.
Each comment page contains all of the Dissenter comments that
have been made pertaining to the URL, as well as all replies to those
comments.
While uncovering the operation of Dissenter, we nd several
undocumented identiers within their HTML and JavaScript. We
use these unique 12 byte Dissenter identiers to prevent duplication
and ensure uniqueness of users and content. Each user has a unique
24 hexadecimal digit author-id that remains consistent through
username changes. Similarly, each distinct URL in Dissenter has a
12 byte commenturl-id identier. Finally, every comment and reply
is also assigned a 12 byte comment-id.
We discovered that these identiers are not entirely random or
a hash, but rather contain some structure. Analyzing the identier,
we nd that all three encode state about their creation time. e
rst 4 bytes of the author-, commenturl-, and comment-ids are a
Unix timestamp in seconds that describes the creation of entity;
for example, an account created on February 28, 2019 at 16:23:53
UTC, will have an author-id beginning with 5c780b19. Similarly, a
commenturl-id encodes the rst time a URL appears in Dissenter.
While there appears to be additional structure in the remaining 16
hexadecimal digits, we are unable to determine its meaning as of
this writing. In order to verify these ndings, we created our own
Dissenter accounts and posted innocuous content.
Finally, when a user posts a comment or reply in Dissenter, they
have the option to label it as Not Safe For Work (NSFW). By default,
these posts are invisible both to unauthenticated and authenticated
Dissenter users; in order to view this content, a logged-in user must
explicitly “opt-in” via the Dissenter seings page. Because NSFW
posts are hidden from all but authenticated users that have opted-
in, this eectively creates hidden content within a shadow overlay.
Similarly, an “oensive” label also exists for Dissenter comments,
although unlike NSFW, it is not tagged by the user creating the
content. As with NSFW content, an authenticated user must opt-in
to viewing oensive comments.
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3 METHODOLOGY
e primary interface to Dissenter is their browser or website.
While Dissenter has an API, it is neither documented nor intended
for public use. Hence, our methodology required basic reverse engi-
neering of their platform and the application of several techniques
to completely and programmatically gather Dissenter-internal data
including users, user meta-data (including the social network), com-
ments, and the URLs for each comment thread. Using this method-
ology, we eectively mirror the Dissenter database.
is section rst details our data collection campaign and shows
the steps taken to verify its accuracy and completeness. We then
augment the Dissenter data by gathering the content of selected
URLs commented upon for additional context. Finally, we describe
our comment content classication techniques to enrich our under-
standing of comment content and user behavior. Ethical considera-
tions of our work are provided in §7.
3.1 Gab-Based Username Harvesting
While Dissenter home pages provide important data on users and
links to comments, there is no publicly available central database
of usernames. us, a central component of our methodology is to
harvest Dissenter usernames. Note that registering for Dissenter
requires an active Gab account. erefore, Dissenter users are nec-
essarily Gab users, and we leverage this fact in order to enumerate
Dissenter users before beginning to crawl other Dissenter content.
Initially, we aempted to gather Gab usernames via a combina-
tion of mining Pushshi.io [14] and crawling the most popular Gab
account’s (“@a”, belonging to Gab founder Andrew Torba) follow-
ers, which is automatically followed by new users on the platform
when their account is created. However, this methodology failed
to uncover users that hadn’t posted on Gab, had manually ceased
following @a, and our results suggested a period of time before the
@a handle was automatically followed by new users.
As discussed in §2.2, each Dissenter user account is associated
with a unique identier. In a similar vein, Gab accounts also have a
unique user identier. Unlike Dissenter’s author-ids, however, Gab
user IDs do not encode creation time, but are instead a counter be-
ginning at 1, the user ID associated with “@e”, belonging to former
Gab Chief Technology Ocer (CTO) Ekrem Bu¨yu¨kkaya. Having
created a test account for which the Gab ID is known, we query
the Gab API endpoint https://gab.com/api/v1/accounts/<Gab
ID> for IDs between 1 and our account’s ID to retrieve JSON-
encoded information pertaining to that user. Gab’s API helpfully
returns an error when an ID is not associated with a user account,
and in this manner, we are able to exhaustively enumerate Gab’s
user base. Among the information present in the user data JSON
is the account creation date and time, which largely conrms the
hypothesis that the Gab ID is a monotone increasing counter. Some
exceptions to monotonicity exist in which Gab assigned an unal-
located lower-valued ID numbers to new user accounts; whether
these ID values became free aer a user deleted their account, or
whether gaps were deliberately placed between consecutively allo-
cated IDs earlier in its history is unclear. Figure 2 shows when the
account associated with each Gab ID number was created; apart
from two distinct time periods, Gab IDs are generally assigned
sequentially and are monotonically increasing.
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Figure 2: Gab User IDs Assigned to NewAccounts Over Time
is enumeration process reveals 1.3M distinct accounts, a sig-
nicant number more than discovered in prior work in 2018 [34],
which discovered 336k users. In addition to the two years separat-
ing [34] and our study, the dierence is explained by a large number
of discovered Gab users that have not posted any messages, do not
follow any other Gab users, and are similarly not followed by any
other users. Because our methodology discovers these “silent” and
“friendless” Gab users, who may conversely be active on Dissenter,
our results in §4 are not biased toward Gab users that follow other
users or have followers themselves, or post content on the platform.
Next, we determine which Gab users are also Dissenter users.
For each Gab username discovered, we send an HTTP request
to the URL of the corresponding Dissenter homepage, if it exists
(https://dissenter.com/user/<Gab username>). Based on the
HTTP response sizes, we are able to identify Dissenter accounts,
which are at least 10 kB; responses for non-existent users are ∼150
bytes. Of the 1.3M Gab usernames we enumerated via its API, 101k
also have Dissenter accounts, representing approximately 8% of all
Gab users.
3.2 Dissenter Comment Harvesting
With the usernames from §3.1, we crawled Dissenter for URLs that
users comment on, the comments they made about those pages, as
well as replies to other users’ comments. Our crawler rst visits
the home page of each Dissenter user to capture their meta-data,
including username, display name, author-id, and biography. en
the crawler gathers the set of URLs the user has commented on.
We then iterate over the set of commented-upon URLs. For
each URL, we visit its comment page in Dissenter and collect the
commenturl-id, the number of comments and number of up- and
down-votes the URL has received, as well as the title and brief
description. As noted in §2.2, the title and description may be
ambiguous or empty, depending on the underlying content the
commented-upon URL describes and the ability of the Dissenter
system to parse this data. Within each comment page, we iterate
over the comments and replies. For each comment, we record
the author-id, comment-id, and the comment text. Comment text
appears to have no character limit; the longest comment we nd is
>90k characters, consisting of the word “ha” repeated 45k times in
response to a YouTube video discussing Facebook’s political bias.
Replies can be made in response to both comments as well as to
replies themselves; there also appears to be no practical limit on
the depth at which replies might be made, e.g., a reply to a reply
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to a reply is valid. In addition to the data we collect for comments,
we also note the comment-id of the content to which the reply is
replying. Although the HTTP response headers indicate that a rate-
limit of 10 requests per minute is employed by the servers hosting
Dissenter content, this counter is per-URL; because we do not need
to request the same URL twice in our crawl, we are unimpeded by
this rate-limit.
Each comment is available from the URL
https://dissenter.com/comment/<CID>/, where CID is that com-
ment’s comment-id. We call this page the comment-page, as its
purpose is to display a single comment as well as any replies.
For reasons that unclear, comment pages contain a JavaScript ele-
ment with an unused (commented-out) JavaScript variable called
“commentAuthor”. commentAuthor denes an array with user data.
While much of this embedded user data is identical to what is
available to us via the user’s homepage, it also contains otherwise
undiscoverable meta-data including the user’s language seing,
permissions, and view-lter preferences. We save these additional
hidden meta-data as part of our per-user characterization.
To obtain the NSFW and oensive content described in §2.2, we
re-spider Dissenter using the HTTP cookies of an authenticated
account we created with NSFW and oensive content enabled sep-
arately, so that we are able to discern between content labeled
NSFW by the submier and comments marked as oensive. ese
comments have no specic ag or other identier present in the
document body to indicate their presence; therefore, we infer NSFW
and oensive comments as those found when authenticated with
these ags enabled that were not previously discovered. In order
to ensure we do not erroneously mislabel content as NSFW or of-
fensive because of crawler errors, we monitor request timeouts
and re-request missed pages, and ensure that subsequent runs only
consider comments made during the initial spider’s time frame. Ad-
ditionally, we manually conrm 100 comments classied as NSFW
or oensive by our subsequent crawls by aempting to view these
comments both while authenticated with the NSFW and oensive
view preferences enabled and while not authenticated. Our NSFW
and oensive comment results are discussed in §4.3.1.
In total, we obtain 1.68M comments and replies on 588k distinct
URLs made by >101k users via our methodology. Macro character-
istics of these data are discussed in detail in §4.
3.3 YouTube Crawling
Typically, we rely on the title and description provided by the Dis-
senter application in the comment page in order to gain valuable
context about URLs being commented upon. However, Dissenter’s
own methodology for URL content appears unable to handle the
most popular source of commented-upon URLs: YouTube videos.
ese pages generally appear with the title ”/watch” and a null de-
scription, although the video itself is embedded in the page. ere-
fore, because YouTube content in particular represents a sizable
percentage of our data (128k URLs) and because we seek to un-
derstand the content that generates comments, we also gather the
content of the underlying web page for YouTube Dissenter com-
ments. Because YouTube pages require JavaScript to render prop-
erly, we use Selenium [13] to automate content retrieval. e data
we seek (e.g., video title, uploader name) resides in large blocks of
JavaScript, which may explain its absence from Dissenter. For each
URL, we classify the content as one of three distinct types – “video”,
pages that contain a single YouTube video, “user”, a homepage for
a particular YouTube user, and “channel”, which is a collection of
videos under a single banner.
3.4 Social Network Crawling
Finally, we return to Gab in order to gain context about the social
network that Dissenter users inhabit. Social relationships on Gab
are directional; much like in Twier, a user may become a follower
of another user, and may accumulate followers themselves. While
Dissenter users are able to “follow” other Dissenter users, none of
the Dissenter browser, plugin, user home page, web application, or
hidden meta-data reveal followers, or allow even an authenticated
user to view his or her followers and following users. Presumably
this is because the social network aspect of Dissenter is a subset of
Gab, and is an as-yet unimplemented part of the Dissenter experi-
ence. erefore, we use Gab followers as a proxy, and because Gab
users are a strict superset of Dissenter users, any two Dissenter
users can follow each other on Gab.
We use the Gab API in order to obtain these relationships for
further analysis in §4. Using the Gab API, we gather the followers
and followed users of each Dissenter user. We note that Gab exposes
its rate-limiting in the HTTP response headers by including the
number of remaining requests, as well as the time at which the
request limit will be refreshed. To minimize impact on the service,
we issue at most one request per second, and monitor the number
of remaining requests. If necessary, we wait until the number of
available requests has been refreshed before continuing to issue
new requests for Gab friends. Note that results from querying the
Gab API for the social network are paginated, thus we can ensure
that we gather the complete network graph.
Finally, by removing non-Dissenter users from the followers and
those followed obtained by querying Gab, we construct a Dissenter-
specic social network graph.
3.5 Classication
To gain a more complete understanding of Dissenter, we must
understand the content and context of the comments and replies. In
particular, we are interested in assessing the degree of toxicity and
oensiveness. While signicant prior work exists on automatically
labeling hate and toxic speech, current approaches yield accuracies
between 70-80% [15] and it remains an open research problem.
For example, there are indications that the models encode racial
bias [27], while some models can be deceived [20].
To underscore the diculty of the problem, consider an innocu-
ous comment about the country Pakistan. is comment could
be construed as hateful as it contains the substring “paki,” a false
positive. However, not performing stemming and fuzzy matching
can yield false negatives, for instance if the hate word is succeeded
with a “z” when using slang. Words themselves are ambiguous and
must be taken in full context. For example, the term “skank” can
be used as a hate term or in reference to a style of dance.
For our purposes, these issues are somewhat mitigated. First, we
are less interested in scoring any particular comment, and instead
are interested in aggregate trends and the distribution of scores.
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Figure 3: Dissenter Comments and Replies per Active User
Next, we compare Dissenter to several baselines which gives us an
idea of relative dierences in scores across users/communities.
Because our work is focused on characterizing Dissenter rather
than improving the state-of-the-art in hate speech detection, we
therefore employ multiple approaches to label comments in order
to bound our estimates of its toxicity.
3.5.1 Dictionary. We utilize the modied Hatebase [11] dictio-
nary of toxic terms used by the authors of [19] and [34]. is
dictionary contains 1,027 hate words. We tokenize each Dissenter
comment and reply, perform stemming, and then count the number
of tokens that match a term in the dictionary. Our per-comment
hate dictionary score is then the ratio of hate words over the num-
ber of tokens in the comment. While this metric is simple, it misses
important context in the comments. For instance, the ambiguous
terms “queen” and “pig” appear in the dictionary. However, by
using the same dictionary as these prior works, we can draw direct
meaningful comparisons.
3.5.2 Perspectives. Next, we leverage the Google Perspective
API. e Perspective API provides several models that provide
scores for several aspects of toxicity. Perspectives allows us to
eectively outsource comment scoring, however, as with the other
methods, is has limitations. Further, the API is trained primarily
on Wikipedia data, and thus there are some questions about its
portability.
3.5.3 NLP. Finally, we employ Natural Language Processing
models to build a three-class (hate, oensive, or neither) comment
classier. To train our classier, we use labeled data from [15] which
contains 1,194 hate, 16,025 oensive, and 20,499 neither labels of
Twier tweets gathered via crowd-sourcing. Because of the imbal-
anced complexion of data, we use ADASYN to oversample [18].
We experiment with neural networks, decision trees, and sup-
port vector machines (SVMs) using 1 and 2-grams of cleaned and
stemmed word tokens. Using grid search to tune the hyperparam-
eters, we achieve the highest accuracy using SVMs. With 5-fold
cross-validation, we achieve an F1 score of 0.87 on the Twier train-
ing dataset. Using this SVM model, we compute the probability of
each of the three possible classes for all Dissenter comments and
replies.
4 RESULTS
is section begins with a high-level characterization of the Dis-
senter platform, analyzing users and URLs being discussed. We
then measure hate speech and toxicity in Dissenter as compared to
other platforms, as well as investigate the relationship of toxicity
to content and the social network of Dissenter users.
4.1 Dissenter Users
4.1.1 How popular is Dissenter? We rst examine the set of Dis-
senter users we discover using the methodology of §3.1. As noted
in §2.2, the author-id identier encodes each account’s creation
time. Dissenter experienced a steep initial inux of users to the
platform, as nearly 79k (77%) joined through the rst full month of
operation (March, 2019).
Of the more than 101k unique usernames we discover, approxi-
mately 47k (47%) commented on at least one URL. Considering only
these active users that have made at least one comment, Figure 3
shows that approximately 90% of comments are made by about 14%
of active users (7% of total users). e long tail of Figure 3 indicates
that many users made a relatively small number of comments. We
note that none of these users fall into the top twenty Gab users by
number of followers, score, or PageRank as determined by prior
work [34], nor are they prominent in the Dissenter social network
as will be shown in §4.4. Finally, we discover approximately 1,300
users who commented on URLs through our Dissenter crawl that
did not appear in our enumeration of Gab’s users in §3.1. We were
initially surprised by this nding, as an active Gab account is a pre-
requisite for creating a Dissenter account. On closer examination,
we discovered that these accounts appeared to be deleted by their
owners, as their Gab home pages matched the appearance of an
account that we test-deleted. Interestingly, these users’ Dissenter
accounts and comments remain despite the deletion of their Gab
account.
Takeaways: Slightly more than half (53%) of Dissenter’s users
have not commented on a URL or replied to another user’s comment.
is does not necessarily mean that these users are inactive; users
can interact with Dissenter by giving “thumbs up” or “thumbs down”
on both the URL and other users’ comments, but these actions are
transparent to us.
While Dissenter’s user base is a strict subset of Gab’s, Dissenter is
not simply a Gab in miniature. Its core group of users are extremely
active on the site, posting thousands of comments in lile over a
year on web content that they presumably consume beforehand.
We discover more than 1,300 users whose Gab accounts were
deleted. e comments le by these users remain on Dissenter,
and because their Gab account no longer exists, they are unable to
authenticate (which requires an active Gab account) to delete these
posts.
4.1.2 User Characterization. Using the embedded JavaScript
data described in §3.2, we are able to more extensively characterize
the 47k active users. Two Dissenter users are agged as “isAd-
min”: @a, Andrew Torba’s account, and @shadowknight412, which
belongs to Rob Colbert, the Gab CTO. Despite the existence of “is-
Moderator”, no active accounts we queried had this moderator ag
set, although it is possible one or more moderator accounts exist
that do not post comments. Eight accounts were banned from the
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platform; of these, several accounts had no obvious explanation for
being banned based on the comments we obtained, while for others
the reason is clear. For example, one account is clearly related to
a home remodeling company and posted only advertisements for
its business, while another posted what appears to be the home
address of a federal ocial and expressed a desire for an “accident”
to happen to that individual. Table 1 counts the frequency of all
possible account ags across the active user set.
Users can further apply lters to show or hide comments on
URLs based on categories of users or comment labels. For instance,
“NSFW” is a label that a user may apply when posting a comment,
and “pro” is a label that a designates a paid GabPRO account – a sta-
tus that unlocks additional platform features, such as the removal
of ads and ability to upload larger videos. Table 1 summarizes the
number of positive responses for each comment lter. Of note,
nearly all users choose to see content from “pro”, “veried”, and
“standard” Dissenter accounts; this is unsurprising, as all three of
these are applied by default. However, the “NSFW” and “oensive”
preferences are disabled by default. We discover 18k comments clas-
sied by Dissenter as NSFW (∼10k) or “oensive” (∼8k), though we
were unable to determine with certainty what moderation policies
or user feedback generates an “oensive” classication. Because
only 15% and 7% of active users enable the NSFW and “oensive”
lters, respectively, these comments constitute a kind of shadow
platform within Dissenter.
Takeaways: Artifacts in the Dissenter HTML source show that
even in Dissenter, users get banned for speech that is deemed unac-
ceptable. Further, the “view” ags indicate that NSFW and oensive
content exists as a shadow overlay on the Dissenter overlay itself,
viewable only to a fraction of Dissenter users.
4.2 Content Analysis
Since Dissenter serves as a comments section for users concerned
that their ability to comment directly on the source material might
be curtailed, it is only intuitive to examine what content they dis-
cuss.
4.2.1 What URLs are being commented on? We discover 588k
URLs that have been commented upon according to Dissenter’s
own unique identier, the commenturl-id. However, this number
over-counts unique content in two ways. First, Dissenter dieren-
tiates between URLs that dier only in the protocol portion; that
is, the HTTP and HTTPS version of URLs will receive dierent
commenturl-ids, separate comment pages, and can contain entirely
dierent comment content. We observe 400 distinct URLs that dif-
fer only in the protocol part of the URL; another 60 dier only
by the presence or absence of a trailing forward-slash character.
Second, Dissenter’s handling of URLs with HTTP GET query pa-
rameters causes unique content over-counting. Many of the URLs
we observe contain several GET parameters separated by the “&”
character; however, because page content is typically only deter-
mined by a single parameter, if at all, it is likely unnecessary to
store more than the rst key-value pair as part of the URL in the
Dissenter system.
A full 97% (571k) of URLs in Dissenter are HTTPS; another 2%
(15k) are HTTP, and a small fraction contain browser- specic
protocols, such as chrome://. irteen URLs contain the file
protocol, indicating that the URL points to a le on the user’s le
system. While most of these URLs point to Windows “leer drives”
like C:\, several include le paths that appear to point to legitimate
documents on the user’s le system.
Of the URLs we discover within the Dissenter, the overwhelming
majority point to pages under the .com TLD (78%); the second-most-
frequent TLD is .uk (7.5%). While .be rounds out the top ve TLDs,
this TLD most frequently appears a domain hack for YouTube URLs
(e.g. youtu.be/id) rather than for Belgian content.
In addition to the popular TLDs, Table 2 gives the most popu-
lar second-level domains by percentage of URLs. YouTube is by
far the most common, comprising about 21% of all URLs we dis-
covered with comments between the youtube.com and youtu.be
domains. Twier content is the second most frequent with about
7% of all URLs. With the exception of Bitchute, a video hosting
alternative to YouTube oriented towards the same general user
base as Gab [29], the remainder of the top URLs are news-oriented
websites. In contrast, when we rank domains by median comment
volume per URL, YouTube ranks very low, with a median comment
count of 1. Domains with the highest comment volumes per URL
are typically fringe content with a small number of commented
URLs. For instance, thewatcherfiles.com, a conspiracy aggre-
gation site, ranks rst with 116 comments on one URL about the
Jewish Blood Libel; the second highest comment volume domain
is deutschland.de, with 95 comments on a single URL, most of
which express anger about the Muslim diaspora in Europe.
Takeaways: Dissenter comments are typically made on video
streaming, social media, or news sites, with YouTube comprising
the largest fraction of commented domains. However, domains
with the highest comment volume per URL are disjoint from the set
of highest commented URL counts and oen contain fringe content.
Dissenter users can comment on any URL, including those that are
local to their own le system or are non-existent.
4.2.2 YouTube. YouTube content comprises a large fraction of
the URLs commented on in Dissenter; Table 2 shows that ∼22%
of URLs we obtained with comments are YouTube content. Fur-
ther, Dissenter comment-pages typically contain lile information
about the video itself, likely because this information is dynami-
cally generated and thus dicult for Dissenter itself to mine. is
creates diculty in understanding the content at the URL, and is
compounded by the fact that YouTube videos also have no inher-
ent bias, making broad generalizations of this content eectively
impossible.
erefore, as described in §3.3, we gather and analyze the con-
tent of 128k YouTube URL present in our data. e majority of
these YouTube URLs are videos: 125k are labeled video content,
along with 2k channels and 1k users. Because YouTube videos
may be taken down by the owner or the platform itself for a vari-
ety of reasons, we discovered only 109k active video pages, while
16k were unavailable. While the most common reason for video
removal was a generic “Video Unavailable” label, 3k videos were
listed as private and required permission to view, another 3k were
unavailable because the YouTube account that had posted them was
terminated, and nearly 400 were removed for violating YouTube’s
hate speech policy. It is noteworthy that even in the event that
YouTube takes action to remove objectionable comment, Dissenter
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Table 1: User Attribute Flags and Comment View-Filters Enabled for Active Users (n=47,165)
User Flags Comment Filters
canLogin 47,152 (99.97%) isBanned 8 (0.02%) is investor 137 (0.29%) pro 47,093 (99.85%)
canPost 47,150 (99.97%) isAdmin 2 (0.00%) is premium 61 (0.13%) veried 47,103 (99.87%)
canReport 47,158 (99.99%) isModerator 0 (0.00%) is tippable 73 (0.15%) standard 47,112 (99.89%)
canChat 47,153 (99.97%) is pro 1,257 (2.67%) is private 1,838 (3.90%) nsfw 7,094 (15.04%)
canVote 47,152 (99.97%) is donor 397 (0.84%) veried 485 (1.03%) oensive 3,456 (7.33%)
Table 2: Most Frequently Commented TLDs and Domains
Top Level Domains Domain
.com 455,885 (77.57%) .au 6,892 (1.17%) youtube.com 121,928 (20.75%) foxnews.com 12,196 (2.08%)
.uk 43,808 (7.45%) .ca 5,490 (0.93%) twier.com 40,392 (6.87%) bitchute.com 12,124 (2.06%)
.org 19,502 (3.32%) .net 4,787 (0.81%) breitbart.com 23,705 (4.03%) zerohedge.com 8,634 (1.47%)
.de 10,257 (1.75%) .nz 2,979 (0.51%) bbc.co.uk 16,213 (2.76%) theguardian.com 8,010 (1.36%)
.be 8,013 (1.36%) .no 2,928 (0.50%) dailymail.co.uk 15,752 (2.68%) youtu.be 7,819 (1.33%)
Other 27,194 (0.05%) Total 587,735 (100%) Other 320,962 (54.61%) Total 587,735 (100%)
still provides a platform for users to comment on what was at that
URL, serving as an ersatz digital history for the content that once
existed there.
Each active video has a “content-owner”, the name of the entity
or individual that uploaded the content. Interestingly, Fox News
and CNN – generally considered to be on opposite ends of the
ideological spectrum – both appear in the top six most commented
upon YouTube content producers. 2.4% of all YouTube videos that
had a comment were produced by Fox News, as compared with
0.6% for CNN. Normalized by the fraction of all videos produced by
each news source, 4.7% of all Fox News videos have at least one Dis-
senter comment while only 0.5% of CNN videos were commented
upon. Slightly more than 10% of the active videos we crawl have
their comment functionality disabled on the YouTube platform, re-
inforcing Dissenter’s argument that it provides an outlet for users
to express their opinions on content where it would otherwise not
be allowed.
Takeaways: YouTube is a sizable fraction of all Dissenter com-
ment URLs; the videos Dissenter users comment on frequently
disallow commenting, and are oen removed from YouTube alto-
gether for a variety of reasons.
4.2.3 Are there language dierences in Dissenter comments? Us-
ing the langid [10] language identication tool, we classify each
of the 1.68M comments and replies in our dataset. Our results
indicate that Dissenter comments are overwhelmingly in Eng-
lish (1.57/1.68M or 94%). German is the second most popular lan-
guage with 31k (2%); this matches our expectations as .de is the
fourth most-common TLD and rst non-English-speaking coun-
try’s Country-Code TLD (ccTLD) in Table 2. French, Spanish, and
Italian complete the top ve most-frequent languages, each with
less than 0.5% popularity.
Takeaways: e vast majority (94%) of Dissenter comments
are in English, with German the only other language achieving
>1% representation.
4.3 Dissenter Toxicity
e concept of toxicity online has gained a bit of a spotlight lately.
In a nutshell, toxicity is loosely dened as anti-social behavior
that causes harm to a community at the social level. ings like
harassment, hate speech, personal aacks, and trolling can all be
considered toxic, as they reduce the inherent utility of the platform
they occur on, as well as harm its underlying community of users.
Previous work [22, 34], as well as articles and world events have
indicated that Gab is more toxic than the average community.
In fact, at least part of the motivation behind Gab and Dissenter’s
existence is that its user base was considered too toxic for platforms
like Twier, and that the discussions they have are similarly consid-
ered unsuitable by many platforms. is raises several interesting
questions that we aim to answer in this section using our content
classication techniques in §3.5. Are Dissenter users particularly
toxic? What kind of toxicity is exhibited?
4.3.1 NSFW and Oensive Comments. As described in §2.2, a
user is presented with the option to label a comment or reply as
NSFW when posting. is label prevents the comment from ap-
pearing to any user that has not explicitly opted-in to seeing this
content. We nd ∼10k comments (0.6% of all comments) tagged
as NSFW that appear only in an authenticated crawl’s results with
NSFW-viewing enabled compared to an unauthenticated baseline
crawl. Although the mechanism for a comment being classied
as “oensive” is opaque to us, we similarly discover ∼8k (0.5% of
all comments) labeled “oensive” by Dissenter. Posts can be “re-
ported” by users, which informs the reporting individual that the
content will be “reviewed as soon as possible.” is mechanism is
one hypothesis for how “oensive” comments become labeled; al-
ternatively, Dissenter may aempt to automatically label comments
based on the presence of certain words in the text.
In order to ensure that we did not obtain false positive classica-
tions due to HTTP timeouts and other errors introduced from the
crawling framework, we perform two validation steps. First, we
keep track of any URL during our crawl that received a timeout er-
ror and mark those URLs for re-crawling at a later time. We repeat
this process until all pages have been successfully parsed by our
framework. Second, we select a random sample of 100 NSFW and
“oensive” comments, and perform a manual validation to ensure
that the comment only appears when authenticated and with the
proper seings enabled. All 100 comments we manually veried
were correctly classied as NSFW or “oensive”, although several
were posted both as NSFW and also without the label. Because a
user cannot see even their own NSFW-labeled comments if they
do not have this visibility seing enabled, it is possible that these
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Figure 4: NSFW, Oensive, and Aggregate Comments Com-
parison
duplicate posts occurred when a user posted a comment with the
NSFW label enabled but did not see it appear, and re-posted without
the label believing their rst post was unsuccessful.
We nd that NSFW content is more toxic than the standard
comments and replies posted to Dissenter, and “oensive” com-
ments are much more so. Figure 4 is a CDF of the Perspectives
scores aributed to NSFW and “oensive” comments vs the entire
comment population in the Perspectives categories of “OBSCENE”,
“SEVERE TOXICITY”, and content likely to be rejected by the New
York Times’ moderation section (“LIKELY TO REJECT”.) In all three
categories, we nd the “oensive” content to be signicantly more
extreme than both the unlabeled comments and replies and the
NSFW content. For instance, 80% of the “oensive” comments
score > 0.95 in the LIKELY TO REJECT category, whereas only 25%
of NSFW comments and < 20% of all comments score this high. e
NSFW content is also more extreme than the aggregate Dissenter
comments, but to a lesser degree than the “oensive” comments.
is indicates that users are correctly using the NSFW label on
some of the more extreme content on Dissenter, and that the “of-
fensive” labeling mechanism captures the most radical and toxic
content. However, because ∼85% of users do not have the NSFW
or “oensive” view-seings enabled, including both Gab’s CEO and
CTO at the time we ingested user seings in §4.1, these comments
act as a network within a social network, where the most extreme
content on the platform appears.
Takeaways: NSFW and “oensive” content comprises a small
fraction of the total Dissenter comment corpus; however, their
Perspective scores indicate that this content is substantially more
extreme than non-tagged content, and is not visible to most Dis-
senter users with their current seings. e labeling mechanism for
“oensive” comments, while unknown, captures the most extreme
content on Dissenter, which is substantially more toxic than the
total Dissenter comments in aggregate.
4.3.2 Are URLs with toxic comments up- or down-voted? Dis-
senter allows authenticated users to cast votes on the URL its mem-
bers have commented upon by clicking a “thumbs up” or “thumbs
Figure 5: SEVERE TOXICITY Score Compared to URL Net Dis-
senter Vote Score
Table 3: Overview of baseline toxicity datasets.
Dataset # comments # Dissenter users
NY Times 4,995,119 N/A
Daily Mail 14,287,096 N/A
Reddit 13,051,561 35,718
down” buon. We collect this data for 588k URLs in our crawl,
and compare the net vote score (upvotes minus downvotes) to the
Perspective SEVERE TOXICITY scores for comments on these URLs.
104k URLs had a positive net vote score, 64k a negative score, and
the majority (420k) had a net score of zero. 581k (99%) have a
net vote score n ∈ (−10, 10). Figure 5 plots the mean and median
Perspective SEVERE TOXICITY score for each URL with its net vote
score. 415k URLs have no votes in either direction, contributing to
the grouping around the zero net vote score. e zero vote score
content exhibits the highest mean and median SEVERE TOXICITY
scores, evidenced by the tall peak of points around x = 0. As the net
vote score absolute value increases, however, the SEVERE TOXICITY
scores corresponding to those URLs decrease. URLs with negative
net vote scores in general having higher SEVERE TOXICITY scores
than their positive counterparts. One possible explanation for this
is that Dissenter users down vote a given URL because they dis-
agree with its content. Disagreeing with said content is also likely
a trigger for toxic speech.
Takeaways: Signicantly up- or down-voted content appears
to generate lower comment mean and median toxicities, while
comments with net vote scores near zero garner toxicity scores
across the spectrum.
4.4 Relative Toxicity
Next, we consider whether Dissenter users are more or less toxic
than other users and platforms.
4.4.1 Baseline Datasets. In addition to Dissenter comments, we
construct three additional datasets: 1) NY Times, 2) Daily Mail, and
3) Reddit (summarized in Table 3). e NY Times and Daily Mail
datasets are comments crawled from their respective sites, acquired
from [35]. We chose these two news outlets for a few reasons. First,
they are both relatively popular on Dissenter; Daily Mail is the
5th most commented on domain by Dissenter users (see Table 2)
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Figure 6: Ratio of Dissenter to Reddit Post Counts
and NY Times is the 21st most popular. Next, they are on dierent
sides of the political spectrum. Finally, the Perspective API has a
set of models that are trained on NY Times comment moderator
decisions, providing additional insight into how the model describes
the specic environment in which it was trained.
e Reddit dataset includes comments by accounts on Reddit that
we believe are likely to controlled by a corresponding Dissenter user.
e construction of the Reddit dataset is a bit more complicated, but
allows us to answer some questions related to how Dissenter users’
behavior diers from their behavior on other, moderated social
media platforms. We construct this dataset by querying Reddit for
users matching our known Dissenter usernames. is revealed a
large number of Reddit users: more than 56k Dissenter usernames
(56%) correspond to a registered Reddit account. Of course, dierent
people might choose the same username on dierent platforms, so
we do not claim that all 56k of these accounts represent the same
person on both platforms. While it is a near certainty that there
are false positives in this construction, especially for particularly
short usernames or usernames based on common words, previous
work [23] established a lower bound precision of 0.6 for this type
of matching and found it sucient to describe behavioral trends
when studying user migration from Reddit. With these caveats
in mind, for each of the 56k identied Reddit accounts, we query
Pushshi [14] for all of the comments they made on Reddit.
Figure 6 plots the CDF of user “comment ratios,” which is dened
as dd+r , whered is the number of posts a user has made on Dissenter,
and r the analogous count on Reddit. We consider only users that
have commented on at least one platform so that the ratio is well-
dened; this limits the scope to 31k unique usernames. ere is a
roughly even split between which platform has been used more. e
users that have more comments on Dissenter, however, tend to use
that service exclusively, with more than a third having commented
only on Dissenter.
Takeaways: A majority of usernames (∼56%) exist on both
Dissenter and Reddit. More than a third of users on both platforms
post on Dissenter exclusively, as opposed to 20% that post only on
Reddit.
4.4.2 Is the fear of censorship warranted? One of the motivating
factors behind Dissenter’s creation is moderators are stiing the
open discussion of content on their platforms. e Perspective API
provides a model that can help us ascertain whether or not this
is the case: the LIKELY TO REJECT model. is model is trained
on decisions from New York Times comment moderators and pro-
vides a score indicating whether or not they would reject a given
comment on an article from being published. Figure 7a plots the
CDF of scores from the LIKELY TO REJECT model for comments
from Dissenter NY Times, Daily Mail, and Dissenter users’ Reddit
accounts. From the Figure, we see that over 75% of Dissenter com-
ments receive a LIKELY TO REJECT score of 0.50 or more and 50%
of comments receive a score above 0.75. While the gure makes the
dierent norms on NY Time and Daily Mail quite obvious, Dissenter
comments stand out as being signicantly more likely to reject than
comments from other platforms. We also note that the Dissenter
users’ Reddit comments follow a mostly uniform distribution that
falls somewhere between the Daily Mail comments and the NY
Times comments. Finally, although we do not show the results
for clarity purposes, we found that when looking at just Dissenter
comments on NY Times or Daily Mail URLs the LIKELY TO REJECT
score distributions follow the same shape as the Dissenter curve in
Figure 7a.
is result indicates that a substantial chunk of Dissenter com-
ments are indeed considered unsuitable for publishing (at least by
NY Times standards) and provides some degree of justication for
Dissenter’s motivation. It further indicates that this behavior might
be associated with Dissenter itself, since Dissenter users’ Reddit
accounts fall somewhere between comments from NY Times and
Daily Mail. Unfortunately, the LIKELY TO REJECT model provides
no explanation of why a comment might have been rejected, but
we can get a feeling by looking at the scores from other models.
Takeaways: e Perspective LIKELY TO REJECT model indi-
cates that Dissenter comments are signicantly more likely to be
rejected by comment section moderators, lending support for Dis-
senter’s niche in subverting moderation.
4.4.3 How toxic are Dissenter comments? e SEVERE TOXICITY
model oers another window into the type of comments posted by
Dissenter’s user. is Perspective model scores content by its ability
to cause users to feel like they do not want to participate in further
discussion, and is less sensitive to positive uses of profanity (e.g.,
“Damn, that’s cool”) than similar toxicity models oered by the
Perspective API. A high SEVERE TOXICITY score for a comment in-
dicates a “very hateful, aggressive, or disrespectful comment” [17].
Like previous work ([16, 19, 34]),we compare the amount of
toxic hate speech on Dissenter to similar platforms. Figure 7b
plots the CDF of SEVERE TOXICITY for our datasets. Dissenter
comments clearly score the highest in toxicity scores of the four
data sources considered; approximately 20% of Dissenter comments
have a SEVERE TOXICITY score ≥ 0.5, about double the fraction of
Reddit, the nearest other dataset. Dissenter also has the thickest
tail of the four datasets. Roughly 10% of Dissenter comments score
0.75 or above, indicating that many Dissenter comments contain
toxic speech.
Takeaways: Dissenter comments exhibit substantially higher
levels of toxicity than comments on other platforms. e Perspec-
tive model SEVERE TOXICITY measures very hateful speech, and is
less sensitive to profanity than other toxicity models.
4.4.4 Are Dissenter comments aacking the message or the mes-
senger? ere is nothing inherently wrong with dissenting opinions.
In fact, dissent is part of healthy debate and discussion. However,
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Figure 7: Perspective Model Scores for Dissenter and Related Datasets
ad hominem aacks serve to stie productive debate, and also have
implications when discussing news in particular. Figure 7c plots
the ATTACK ON AUTHOR Perspective scores for Dissenter users, as
well as our baseline datasets. Surprisingly, Dissenter comments do
not a display drastically dierent tendency to contain an aack on
the URL’s author. However, looking at the full distribution here
does not reveal the the full picture.
To gain insight into the type of content that elicits toxic Dis-
senter user comments, we use the classication of the commented
on URLs we discover according to the Allsides media bias rating
organization [12]. Allsides uses multiple methodologies for classi-
fying a media outlet’s political bias, and categorizes popular news
media organizations as “le”, “center-le”, “center”, “center-right”,
or “right”-leaning. By design, Allsides categorizes the bias of main-
stream media organizations and journalists only; therefore, many
URLs that Dissenter users comment upon do not have an Allsides
bias. For example, 437k unique comments appear on YouTube URLs;
YouTube, as a video sharing service, does not have an Allsides bias
ranking (intuitively, users can post either le- or right-leaning con-
tent on the platform.) Similarly, social media sites do not have an
Allsides bias ranking either. Of 1.68M unique comments, approxi-
mately 1M fall on URLs with no Allsides ranking. e preponder-
ance of these comments without an Allsides ranking (∼45%) are on
video sharing site URLs, primarily YouTube. Another 110k are on
social media site URLs, like Twier, Facebook, and Gab, and 155k
more are on media outlets for which Allsides does not have a bias
ranking.
Of the 600k comments on URLs that do have an Allsides bias,
we nd that the underlying media bias has a slight, but signicant
impact (conrmed via two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov; all pairs
p < 0.01) on the toxicity of the comment on that URL. Using the
Perspective SEVERE TOXICITY scores, we compare the scores ac-
cording to each Allsides bias category in Figure 8a. From the gure
we observe that toxicity tends to be higher for more center-leaning
URLs, with the exception of right-leaning URLs, which is lower
than all other bias types. On the other hand, the ATTACK ON AUTHOR
scores in Figure 8b evince a higher likelihood that le-leaning con-
tent will generate comments that are an aack on the author of
the article than the other Allsides bias rankings (again, all distribu-
tions conrmed signicantly dierent via two-sample KS test with
p < 0.01).
Takeaways: Comment Perspective scores are signicantly
inuenced by the underlying media bias. Interestingly, while the
category SEVERE TOXICITY tends to be higher on more center URLs,
ATTACK ON AUTHOR is higher on le-leaning URLS and decreases
the closer to right-leaning we get.
4.5 Social Network Analysis
4.5.1 Are there clusters of hateful users in the Dissenter followers
graph? We construct the directed Dissenter social network graph
using the data from §3.4, inclusive of 45,524 Dissenter users with at
least one comment or reply. Both the in (followers) and out (follow-
ing) degree distributions t a power law distribution. e top three
users by number of followers have 10,705, 9,588, and 8,183 followers,
while the three users following the most other users follow 15,790,
10,646, and 10,625 others. Of note, none of the top ten highest
degree users (in or out) are among the most prolic commenters on
Dissenter overall. is indicates that Dissenter’s user base, while
technically a subset of Gab’s user base, is not uniformly drawn
from Gab’s users. In other words, Dissenter seems to appeal to a
smaller, more niche groups of users. While it might seem easy to
dismiss these users due to their general lack of “popularity” on Gab
proper, we believe this is dangerous. Small, extremely niche online
communities have repeatedly been shown to harbor hateful and
racist activity, have been actively used in disinformation campaigns,
and have spawned numerous acts of violence.
Figure 9a shows the relationship between number of users fol-
lowing versus followed. Fully 15,702 of the users have no followers
and follow no one. We conjecture that these are Gab users who
tried Dissenter, but none of their Gab friends or followers are part
of Dissenter. In general, however, the number of Dissenters each
user follows is proportional to the number of followers.
Next, we examine the relationship between toxicity and the social
network graph. Figure 9b shows the mean and median toxicity
among Dissenter users for a given number of followers, while
Figure 9c analyzes the relationship by number of followed users.
While the toxicity is relatively low for users that are not well-
connected in the graph, there are clear outliers with high toxicity
and high degree. Of particular note, the mean is larger than the
median for small degrees, but is then smaller than the median for
higher degrees – indicating that the toxicity is skewed depending
on the social network.
Given the macro-level toxicity properties of the social network,
we sought to nd the “hateful core,” i.e. clusters of users with high
toxicity that connect to other users also with high toxicity. To nd
this core, we induce a subgraph on our social network that includes
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Figure 9: Dissenter Social Network Analysis
users a and b i: i) a and b are mutual followers; ii) a has posted
≥ 100 comments or replies; iii) a’s median comment toxicity is
≥ 0.3. e restriction to at least 100 comments is to ensure that the
user is active; many users have surprisingly high degree, but with
few (or only one) toxic messages.
e resulting hateful core consists of only 42 users, with six
connected components. ere is one large connected component,
with 32 interconnected users. While 18 of the usernames have an
active account on Twier, we nd seven of the 32 whose Twier
accounts were suspended at some point. e users with active
Twier accounts largely exhibited self-professed radical beliefs
in their Twier proles or posts. us, it appears that the most
connected, hateful users in Dissenter represent both users than
have been banned from Twier, those who use both platforms, as
well as users using Dissenter and not Twier.
Takeaways: We examine the induced social network of Dis-
senter users on the Gab social network, and discover a small “hateful
core” – a cluster of users that are active on Dissenter and routinely
post highly toxic content. We nd that a sizable number of these
users with Twier accounts have been suspended.
5 RELATEDWORK
Hate Speech and Toxicity in User Comments. Zanneou
et al.’s study “What is Gab” [34] is most closely related to this
work, as it examines Dissenter’s parent social network. e au-
thors nd that Gab aracts users from the “alt-right” and fringe
conspiracy communities and that hate speech is prevalent on the
site. As [34] occurred more than a year before Dissenter’s launch, it
does not study the Dissenter comment aggregation system. Lima et
al. [21] also investigate hate speech on Gab, as well as URLs that are
posted on Gab. As with Zanneou’s work, [21] predates Dissenter’s
launch in 2019. Much prior work exists in detecting hate speech
occurrences in online social networks. Hine et al. study /pol/, a
community on the discussion-board website 4chan in [19]. Among
many characterizations of the discussion board, they aempt to
quantify the amount of hate on within the community, and also
identify the URLs that users post in /pol/ comments. However,
unlike Dissenter, /pol/ posts need not include or relate to a URL,
and the toxicity of comments vis-a`-vis the underlying URL is not
studied. Djuric et al. study the prevalence of hate speech in Yahoo
Finance user comments by using a neural language model trained
on low-dimensional text embeddings of the comments [16].
Censorship. Dissenter exists to circumvent user-submied
comment moderation policies, or the inability to comment at all –
in other words, censorship by Big Tech. Web censorship and cen-
sorship detection has a vast body of work; recently, Yadav et al.
[33] studied web censorship mechanisms employed by Indian ISPs.
Proxies are oen employed to anonymize web trac and defeat
censorship eorts, and toward understanding the universe of free
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web proxies, Perino et al. develop a distributed active and passive
measurement system to measure proxy performance [24], which
they characterize in a longitudinal study [25]. In [26], Raman et
al. discuss Mastodon, a decentralized web microblogging platform
that has been forked by Gab in order to avoid being deplatformed
by a single service provider. e pressures toward increasing cen-
tralization that Raman et al. identify could negate the benet Gab
gains from using a decentralized platform, e.g. increased availabil-
ity, diculty to censor, and resilience to outages. Because Dissenter
users are a subset of Gab users, Dissenter is also impacted by this
trend.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
Dissenter is an approach to evading content provider censorship
by decoupling the comment system from the underlying content;
unlike network-level tools (e.g. Tor) that address censorship and
privacy at the protocol level, Dissenter is concerned entirely with
the application layer. Unlike more general social media (e.g. Twier,
Reddit, and even Gab) user activity on Dissenter is clearly bound
to o-site content.
Like its parent social network, Gab, Dissenter claims to support
its users’ right to free speech; in practice, this manifests itself in
toxic content. In fact, our study shows that Dissenter contains
more hate-speech than prior work on Gab [34]. However repulsive
the content on Dissenter, it clearly lls a need for its user base:
Dissenter comments score higher on a machine learning model
trained to classify comments as “likely to be rejected by a content
moderator” than comments from any other data source we studied.
Several additional interesting security and privacy properties
of Dissenter bear discussion. First, a small number of Dissenter
comments on non-HTTP(S) scheme URLs are the result of a user
using Dissenter to view content on their local le system. ese
comments leak information about the user’s le system and the con-
tent they have downloaded. More curious are Dissenter comments
on web browser start pages and tabs, e.g. “chrome://startpage/”.
Indeed, any URL is a potential anchor for a Dissenter comment
thread, suggesting the possibility for a potential form of covert
channel, a hidden conversation within a hidden conversation. e
URL need not exist, can use any arbitrary scheme, and could be
shared among users wishing to engage in a hidden conversation
within the Dissenter platform. Because we cannot easily dier-
entiate between web URLs that are no longer responsive versus
intentionally ctitious URLs, we leave this investigation for future
research.
Second, a concerning aspect of Dissenter is the inability of a
content owner to prevent discussion on their content within the
Dissenter framework. It is not readily possible to block the Dis-
senter browser via traditional ngerprinting techniques as it is built
on the Brave codebase and does not report a distinct user-agent
string. Interestingly, a proactive defense may discourage or even
break the current Dissenter model. A content producer could pre-
emptively post comments within Dissenter for the content they
own to overwhelm the conversation with positive comments. is
has the tangible eect of content publishers being able to potentially
aect the way that Dissenter discussions might go. Such proactive
approaches are important to investigate further in an environment
of active de-platforming.
Finally, we argue that the community should be particularly in-
terested in what Dissenter represents moving forward. It is without
question that computer scientists not only have a role to play in
addressing online safety concerns, but also a responsibility. Further,
future research in the measurements community is uniquely posi-
tioned to have meaningful impact in addressing societal problems
of toxicity and hate speech. e work of policy makers and other
experts depends on a data-driven understanding of these emer-
gent platforms and networks. As the world faces unprecedented
challenges, including increased levels of violence directly tied to
the modern information age and erce debate over censorship and
de-platforming, it is incumbent on us to provide methodologies,
experimentation, and results to understand what is really going on
online.
7 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Considering Dissenter exists as a service designed to circumvent the
moderation policies and discontinued comment sections of content
providers, a further discussion of the ethical implications of our
study is warranted.
By its nature, Dissenter users employ pseudonyms and use the
platform to converse anonymously. However, all of the information
that we collected in this study is publicly available and is in fact
meant for consumption by normal Dissenter users. While we ac-
knowledge that public availability is not a panacea for the potential
misuse of data, we believe that the unmitigated risk to society that
racist and hateful communities like Dissenter can pose outweigh
the potential harm that could come from our study. Specically,
we believe that the type of understanding gained from the present
study is not only sucient but necessary to designing solutions that
guard against the exploitation of the Internet to harm others.
Some users may purposefully or inadvertently post personally
identiable information (PII). While our analyses do not depend
on any PII, we requested a determination from our Institutional
Review Board (IRB) to ensure we were acting ethically. Our IRB
found that the data we analyze is from publicly available Internet
posts where there is no reasonable expectation of privacy, and that
our research methods support benecence and respect for persons.
Finally, none of our work violates Dissenter’s terms of use policies.
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